Sources
Source register
Footnote numbers throughout the scenario refer to the entries below. External links are identified as such. Verification status is stated per entry: the reported 2024 Ukraine ‘killer drones’ claim is a single-source report with no independent public corroboration, and two citations (Reuters; the House of Lords report PDF) are pending a final human check because automated access is blocked. Factual claims carry a July 2026 evidence cut-off.
[1]
The Strategic Defence Review 2025 — Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad
UK Government · 2025
Commits the UK to uncrewed systems at scale, faster procurement and a Digital Targeting Web. Distinguish its categories: uncrewed platforms and autonomous navigation are not autonomous engagement.
[2]
Ambitious, Safe, Responsible: our approach to the delivery of AI-enabled capability in Defence
UK Ministry of Defence · 2022
States the UK position: context-appropriate human involvement in weapons that identify, select and attack targets; no intention to develop fully autonomous weapon systems; Article 36 review of all new weapons.
[3]
Proceed with Caution: Artificial Intelligence in Weapon Systems (HL Paper 16)
House of Lords AI in Weapon Systems Committee · 2023
Parliamentary review of UK policy on AI in weapon systems. Direct fetch is bot-blocked (HTTP 403); URL supplied by the editor and pending final human check.
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5804/ldselect/ldaiwe/16/16.pdf (external link)
[4]
Government response to the House of Lords AI in Weapon Systems Committee report
UK Government · 2024
Restates context-appropriate human involvement and the role of Article 36 weapon reviews, including for iteratively updated systems.
[5]
Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law — position paper
International Committee of the Red Cross · 2025–2026
Defines autonomous weapon systems by autonomous target selection and engagement; recommends prohibitions and constraints organised by function and risk.
https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/4896_002_Autonomous_Weapons_Systems_-_IHL-ICRC.pdf (external link)
[6]
Summary of NATO's revised Artificial Intelligence strategy
NATO · 2024
Principles of responsible use: lawfulness, responsibility and accountability, explainability and traceability, reliability, governability, bias mitigation.
[7]
Responsible Procurement of Military Artificial Intelligence
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) · 2026
Argues procurement can operationalise legal and policy commitments if responsibility allocation and independent testing are built into it.
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/0226_milai_procurement.pdf (external link)
[8]
The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, Volume I
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) · 2019
Examines how military AI interacts with early warning, escalation dynamics and nuclear risk.
[9]
Technological Evolution on the Battlefield
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) · 2025
Documents the jamming/counter-jamming cycle in Ukraine: fibre-optic tethered control, AI terminal lock-on against pre-identified targets, and AI-assisted detection-to-destruction times of just over 30 seconds.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chapter-9-technological-evolution-battlefield (external link)
[10]
Defining Autonomy: Why Software, Not Drones, Will Decide the Next War
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) · 2026
Finds automatic target recognition and navigation assistance already routine, while 'no one has fielded true end-to-end edge autonomy'; FPV strikes still involve three to six people per drone.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-autonomy-why-software-not-drones-will-decide-next-war (external link)
[11]
Germany funds 50,000 strike drones for Ukraine with terminal autonomous tracking (report)
Reuters · 12 July 2026
Reported large-scale order putting terminal autonomy into tens of thousands of systems. URL supplied by the editor; direct fetch is blocked for automated access, so the citation is pending final human check.
https://www.reuters.com/world/germany-funds-50000-strike-drones-ukraine-source-says-2026-07-12/ (external link)
[12]
First deaths from 'killer drones'
New Scientist (International Edition, issue of 20 June 2026) · 20 June 2026
Single-source report: a senior Ukrainian defence-industry figure (drone-maker Alexander Kokhanovskyy) told New Scientist that a 2024 test used fully autonomous drones set to destroy anything in a given area, with confirmed casualties ('We tried it. It's a test. We never implemented it.'). No independent public corroboration: no operational logs, official confirmation, geolocated footage or independent investigation are in the public record. Link is the issue listing; a stable article URL should replace it if verified.
https://www.zinio.com/publications/new-scientist-international-edition/4437/issues/736661 (external link)
[13]
Palantir Q4 2023 Business Update (p. 5)
Palantir Technologies · 2024 · primary document (investor presentation)
Accessed 17 July 2026. Verification: verified — text extracted from the PDF.
States verbatim: following its board meeting in Tel Aviv, 'Palantir agreed to a strategic partnership with the Israeli Ministry of Defense to supply Palantir technology to help the country's war effort.' This is the only fact the case study takes from it.
https://investors.palantir.com/files/Palantir%20Q4%202023%20Business%20Update.pdf (external link)
[14]
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 25 (individual criminal responsibility)
International Criminal Court · 1998 (2024 ed.) · treaty text
Accessed 17 July 2026. Verification: pending human check (publisher blocks automated access; HTTP 403).
Article 25(1): the Court has jurisdiction over natural persons. The ICC does not prosecute corporations.
https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf (external link)
[15]
International Criminal Court Act 2001
UK Parliament (legislation.gov.uk) · 2001 · statute
Accessed 17 July 2026. Verification: verified.
Incorporates ICC offences into UK law; the domestic route through which international-crime liability reaches persons in the UK.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/17 (external link)
[16]
Bribery Act 2010, section 7 — failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery
UK Parliament (legislation.gov.uk) · 2010 · statute
Accessed 17 July 2026. Verification: verified.
The structural model for a corporate failure-to-prevent offence: entity liability for associated persons' conduct, with a reasonable-procedures defence.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/section/7 (external link)
[17]
Customary IHL Rule 151 — individual criminal responsibility
International Committee of the Red Cross (IHL database) · n.d. · customary-law commentary
Accessed 17 July 2026. Verification: pending human check (page did not render for automated access).
Individuals are criminally responsible for the war crimes they commit.
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule151 (external link)
[18]
ICRC position on autonomous weapon systems
International Committee of the Red Cross · 2021 · institutional position
Accessed 17 July 2026. Verification: verified.
Recommends prohibiting unpredictable systems and autonomous force against persons, and strictly constraining the remainder.
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-position-autonomous-weapon-systems (external link)
[19]
IAEA safeguards and verification
International Atomic Energy Agency · n.d. · institutional overview
Accessed 17 July 2026. Verification: pending human check (publisher blocks automated access; HTTP 402).
The declarations-plus-inspections model IAWA borrows from — and departs from.
https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-and-verification (external link)
[20]
IAEA verification and other safeguards activities
International Atomic Energy Agency · n.d. · institutional overview
Accessed 17 July 2026. Verification: pending human check (publisher blocks automated access; HTTP 402).
Details routine and challenge inspection practice.
https://www.iaea.org/topics/verification-and-other-safeguards-activities (external link)
[21]
The Nuremberg industrialist trials (IG Farben; Krupp) — case summaries
US Holocaust Memorial Museum · n.d. · case summary
Verification: URL to be added after human verification — do not cite a search page.
Executives were prosecuted as individuals; the corporate entities themselves were not convicted.
⚠ Exact source URL and independent corroboration required before publication.
[22]
Public Prosecutor v. Frans van Anraat — judgment summary
ICRC national-practice database / Dutch courts · 2005–2009 · case summary
Verification: URL to be added after human verification.
A Dutch businessman convicted of complicity in war crimes for supplying a chemical-weapons precursor with the required knowledge and contribution. A supplier analogue — not a software precedent.
⚠ Exact source URL and independent corroboration required before publication.
[23]
Sweden v. former Lundin executives (alleged complicity in war crimes)
Swedish Prosecution Authority / Stockholm District Court · ongoing as of July 2026 · case report
Verification: status to be re-verified at publication; not described as a conviction.
Proceedings against former executives concerning alleged complicity in grave crimes in Sudan. No verdict is assumed here.
⚠ Exact source URL and independent corroboration required before publication.
[24]
Lafarge proceedings — terrorism financing conviction distinguished from separate complicity litigation
French courts / US DOJ · 2022–ongoing · case report
Verification: URL to be added after human verification.
The company's terrorism-financing case is distinct from separate litigation over alleged complicity in crimes against humanity; the former is not a corporate war-crimes conviction.
⚠ Exact source URL and independent corroboration required before publication.